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      he U.S. position on the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) is set forth below. 
 
The Convention. UNCLOS, together with its Part XI Implementing Agree-
ment (IA),1 establishes a comprehensive set of rules governing the uses of 
the world’s oceans, including the airspace above and the seabed and subsoil 
below. After decades of dispute and negotiation, the Convention reflects 
consensus on the extent of jurisdiction that States may exercise off their 
coasts and allocates rights and duties among all States. It carefully balances 
the interests of coastal States in controlling resource activities off their coasts 
and the interests of all States in protecting the freedom to use the oceans 
without undue interference. UNCLOS and the Part XI IA have both entered 
into force and currently have 168 and 150 Parties, respectively.2 Despite be-
ing a major participant in the negotiation process, the United States did not 
sign the Convention when it was opened for signature in 1982 and is cur-
rently not a Party to UNCLOS or Part XI IA. 
 
President Reagan’s Objections. Upon the adoption of the Convention in 
1982, the United States and other industrialized nations declined to sign or 
ratify UNCLOS, though they supported most of its provisions, because they 
could not accept the Part XI regime established to govern deep seabed min-
ing in areas beyond the continental shelf. Specifically, the United States iden-
tified the following problems with Part XI: (1) provisions that would actually 
deter future development of deep seabed mineral resources, when such de-
velopment should serve the interest of all countries; (2) a decision-making 
process that would not give the United States or other industrialized nations 
a role that fairly reflects and protects their interests; (3) provisions that would 
allow amendments to enter into force for the United States and other nations 
without their approval; (4) stipulations relating to mandatory transfer of pri-
vate technology and the possibility of national liberation movements sharing 
in monetary benefits from deep seabed mining; and (5) the absence of as-
sured access for future qualified deep seabed miners to promote the devel-
opment of these resources.3 
 
1983 U.S. Ocean Policy Statement.4 Following adoption of the Conven-
tion in 1982, it has been the policy of the United States to act in a manner 











to encourage other countries to do likewise. Since the end of World War II, 
the United States has supported efforts to develop a widely recognized legal 
order that will, inter alia, facilitate peaceful, international uses of the oceans 
and provide for equitable and effective management and conservation of 
marine resources. Therefore, although the United States did not sign UN-
CLOS, it recognized that the Convention contains provisions with respect 
to traditional uses of the oceans that generally confirm existing maritime law 
and practice and fairly balance the interests of all States. Accordingly, in 
March 1983, President Reagan announced three decisions to promote and 
protect U.S. oceans interests in a manner consistent with the fair and bal-
anced results in UNCLOS and customary international law. 
First, the President declared that the United States would “accept and 
act in accordance with the balance of interests relating to traditional uses of 
the oceans—such as navigation and overflight.” In return, the United States 
would recognize the rights of other States in their coastal waters, as reflected 
in UNCLOS, so long as coastal States recognized the U.S. and other nations’ 
rights and freedoms under international law. Second, the President indicated 
that the United States would “exercise and assert its navigation and overflight 
rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with 
the balance of interests” reflected in UNCLOS. However, the President 
warned that the United States would not “acquiesce in unilateral acts of other 
States designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international com-
munity in navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses.” Third, 
the President proclaimed U.S. sovereign rights and jurisdiction over a 200-
nautical mile (nm) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) consistent with the pro-
visions of UNCLOS.5 Of note, the Proclamation specifically provides that 
“all States enjoy the high seas freedoms of navigation, overflight, the laying 
of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of 
the sea,” within the EEZ.6  
 
Part XI Implementing Agreement. Recognizing that UNCLOS would not 
receive universal acceptance without modifications to Part XI, the UN Sec-
retary-General convened a series of informal consultations between July 
1990 and July 1994, which resulted in the adoption of the Part XI IA. Article 
2 provides that UNCLOS and the IA shall be interpreted and applied to-
gether as a single instrument.7 The legally binding changes set forth in the 
IA met all U.S. objections to Part XI, and as a result, the United States and 













Transmittal to the Senate for Advice and Consent. The President has the 
power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.8 The United States has 
basic and enduring national interests in the oceans and has consistently taken 
the view that the best way to protect these interests is through a widely ac-
cepted international framework governing uses of the sea. Accordingly, with 
the successful modifications to Part XI, President William Clinton 
 
 
The Part XI Implementing Agreement 
 
(1) Overhauls the Part XI decision-making procedures to accord the 
United States, and other nations with major economic interests at stake, 
adequate influence over future decisions on possible deep seabed min-
ing;  
(2) Guarantees the United States a seat on the critical executive body 
and requires a consensus of major contributors for financial decisions;  
(3) Restructures the deep seabed mining regime along free market prin-
ciples and meets the U.S. goal of guaranteed access by U.S. firms to deep 
seabed minerals on the basis of reasonable terms and conditions; (4) 
Eliminates mandatory transfer of technology and production controls;  
(5) Scales back the structure of the International Seabed Authority 
(ISBA), which administers the mining regime, and links the activation 
and operation of institutions to the actual development of concrete 
commercial interest in seabed mining;  
(6) Together with its allies, the United States could block the Enterprise, 
the ISBA’s operating arm, from being activated, and any mining activi-
ties conducted by the Enterprise are subject to the same requirements 
that apply to private mining companies;  
(7) Does not require States to finance the Enterprise, and subsidies in-
consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are pro-
hibited; grandfathers the seabed mine site claims established on the basis 
of the exploration work already conducted by companies holding U.S. 
licenses; and  
(8) Strengthens the provisions requiring consideration of the potential 











transmitted UNCLOS and the Part XI IA to the Senate for advice and con-
sent on October 7, 1994.9 
Some of the benefits of the Convention identified by the President in-
clude: (1) UNCLOS advances U.S. interests as a global maritime power by 
preserving the right of the U.S. military to use the world's oceans to meet 
national security requirements and of commercial vessels to carry sea-going 
cargoes; (2) UNCLOS advances U.S. interests as a coastal State by providing 
for a 200-nm EEZ; (3) UNCLOS promotes continuing improvement in the 
health of the world's oceans; (4) UNCLOS establishes clear criteria and pro-
cedures to promote access to marine areas, including coastal waters, for ma-
rine scientific research activities; (5) UNCLOS fairly balances the respective 
interests of coastal and maritime States; and (6) UNCLOS’s dispute settle-
ment provisions provide mechanisms to enhance compliance by Parties with 
its provisions. 
The President’s transmittal letter also highlights the reforms to Part XI 
achieved by the IA, which fundamentally changes the Convention’s deep 
seabed mining regime. Accordingly, the President recommended that the 
Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Convention and to the 
IA and give its advice and consent to accession to the Convention and to 
ratification of the IA. Despite widespread bipartisan support for UNCLOS, 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) did not hold hearings on 
the Convention in 1994. 
 
Senate Hearings. President George W. Bush reinvigorated efforts to join 
the Conventions in 2004. In March, the SFRC, under new leadership, held 
hearings and recommended unanimously that the full Senate give its advice 
and consent to accession to the Convention and ratification of the Agree-
ment.10 The full Senate did not vote, however, on the Committee’s recom-
mendation. Since the full Senate took no action, Senate rules required the 
return of the Convention and the IA to the SFRC at the end of the 108th 
Congress. 
On May 19, 2007, President Bush urged the Senate to approve UNCLOS 
during the first session of the 110th Congress, stating that: “joining [the Con-
vention] will serve the national security interests of the United States, includ-
ing the maritime mobility of our armed forces worldwide. It will secure U.S. 
sovereign rights over extensive marine areas, including the valuable natural 
resources they contain. Accession [to the Convention] will promote U.S. in-
terests in the environmental health of the oceans. And it will give the United 











debated and interpreted.”11 Once again, the SFRC held additionally hearings 
and recommended that the full Senate give its advice and consent.12 Not-
withstanding the President’s strong support, the full Senate did not take up 
the matter during the 110th Congress. 
UNCLOS was debated again during the 112th Congress. On May 23, 
2012, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Leon Pan-
etta, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Martin Dempsey testified 
before the SFRA and urged swift ratification of UNCLOS. On June 14, 
2012, the SFRC hosted a “24 Star” hearing where six four-star generals and 
admirals testified in support of UNCLOS accession. Finally, on June 28, 
2012, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Petroleum Insti-
tute, the National Association of Manufacturers, and Verizon Communica-
tions testified before the SFRC arguing that joining the treaty would advance 
U.S. economic interests.13 Despite this overwhelming support, Republican 
opposition doomed U.S. accession and ratification, as thirty-four Republican 
Senators signed a letter to the Chairman of the SFRC indicating that they 
would vote against U.S. accession, effectively killing Senate action on the 
Convention in the 112th Congress.14 
 
Opposition to UNCLOS. Opponents to UNCLOS argue that the costs 
associated with joining the Convention outweigh the benefits, and Article 
30915 forbids States to submit reservations or exceptions exempting itself 
from the Convention’s controversial provisions. For example, the conserva-
tive Heritage Foundation argued that: (1) if it joins the Convention, the 
United States “will be required . . . to transfer royalties generated from hy-
drocarbon production of the U.S. ‘extended continental shelf’ (ECS) to the 
International Seabed Authority for redistribution to developing and land-
locked countries;” (2) the United States does not have to be a Party to UN-
CLOS in order to exploit its ECS; (3) the United States does not have to join 
the Convention to mine the deep seabed; (4) “U.S. accession . . . would ex-
pose the . . . [United States] to lawsuits regarding virtually any maritime ac-
tivity . . .” which would be expensive to defend, and “any adverse judgment 
rendered by an UNCLOS tribunal would be final, could not be appealed, 
and would be enforceable in U.S. territory;” and (5) the United States does 
not have to be a Party to UNCLOS to “protect and preserve its navigational 
rights and freedoms” because the navigational provisions of UNCLOS cod-












Department of Defense Support. UNCLOS supports implementation of 
the National Security Strategy, provides legal certainty in the world’s oceans, 
and preserves essential navigation and overflight rights. Becoming a Party to 
UNCLOS would help preserve the Department of Defense's ability to move 
forces on, over, and under the world’s oceans, whenever and wherever 
needed. UNCLOS establishes stable maritime zones; codifies innocent pas-
sage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage rights; recognizes 
unrestricted military activities on the high sea; works against “jurisdictional 
creep” by preventing coastal States from expanding their own maritime 
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